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Justice and Adaptation to Climate Change in the Asia Pacific Region: 
Designing International Institutions
Paul G. Harris and Jonathan Symons1
Abstract
Many developing states argue that they should be compensated for the costs o f 
adapting to climate change. They point out that industrialised states are 
responsible for the bulk o f historical greenhouse gas emissions and per capita 
first world emissions continue to dwarf developing world emissions. Yet, given 
the substantial internal inequality and rapidly rising emissions within 
developing states such as China and India, the same arguments that justify 
international adaptation compensation might equally justify internal 
redistributive measures. This paper addresses the question o f how international 
institutions that fund adaptation to anthropogenic climate change should be 
designed. After reviewing both communitarian and cosmopolitan arguments 
about adaptation assistance we propose that a more just and more effective 
international agreement on climate change adaptation must achieve a higher 
degree o f consistency between the principles o f burden sharing applied 
internationally and domestically. Adaptation assistance should target human 
welfare directly rather than through compensation payments between states. 
The application o f these arguments is briefly demonstrated primarily by use o f 
China as an example.
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Justice and Adaptation to Oiniate Change in the Asia Pacific Region;
Designing International Institutions
Introduction
It is now predicted -  on the basis of existing greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions alone -  that future decades will see rising sea levels, increased 
intensity and frequency of extreme weather events, harm to biodiversity, net 
reduction in crop yields, more disease and pestilence, and a general increase in 
climate-related human suffering (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
2007, pp. 45-54). The impacts of these changes on human populations will vary 
as a consequence of differing impacts as well as vulnerability and adaptive 
capacities of human communities. As a rule of thumb, the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) suggests that impacts ‘will fall 
disproportionately upon developing countries and the poor persons within all 
countries.’(IPCC 2002, p. 12). Poor people typically have low per capita GHG 
emissions and thus have minimal responsibility for causing climate change. 
This disproportionate impact on those least responsible for climate change 
raises profound questions of fairness that are akin to questions of ijustice,, 
which in turn have implications for the design of international institutions.
The international community's response to climate change involves two 
major elements. The primary focus is on mitigation measures that seek to avoid 
some of the harmful consequences of climate change by reducing atmospheric 
concentrations of GHGs. Negotiations also deal with adaptation measures 
aimed at preparing states for climatic changes that are unavoidable. Whereas 
normative reflection on burden sharing for adaptation to climate change is often 
bundled with analysis of mitigation, here we focus on ethical questions that 
surround adaptation to climate change (cf. Jagers & Goran 2008). We ask 
whether a just international agreement for funding adaptation to climate change 
should compensate developing states for related costs (a position that might 
justify non-conditional payments between states) or contain measures that 
bypass the state to assist vulnerable individuals directly.
Designing a politically feasible institution or regime to enable equitable 
redistribution of climate adaptation burdens is a pressing and difficult task. 
Here we do not prescribe the detail of such an agreement but endeavour to 
identify norms that might be embodied if an international agreement is to 
achieve climate justice. We move from abstract analysis of which actors have
2
which entitlements and obligations to address how intematicmal institutions 
should be designed so as to protect and discharge these rights and duties. Our 
analysis draws attention to a key factor that currently contributes to institutional 
failure: the mismatch between the statist 'country-driven approach' of existing 
institutions (see Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC 2005, Article 3A) 
and cosmopolitan principles that justify burden sharing for adaptation to climate 
change.
Justice and Adaptation to Climate Change
Two broad philosophical positions dominate conceptualisations of 
international justice. On the one hand, a communitarian belief that nations are 
moral ends provides the normative justification for the contemporary statist 
international system. This account holds that obligations of 'justice as fairness, 
only arise in the context of national political communities (Rawls 1999). In 
other accounts, justice is germane because people find "meaning in life by 
virtue of...membership In a community, (Brown 1992, p, 55). An alternative, 
cosmopolitan position rejects the moral supremacy of national membership and 
instead maintains that moral obligations are universal (Pogge 2002, p. 169). As 
such, even though moral cosmopolitanism need not necessitate support for 
cosmopolitan institutions (e.g., world government), cosmopolitan philosophy 
has an uneasy relationship with the statist international system. As we will see, 
the normative justification for how to share the burdens of adaptation to climate 
change is grounded in cosmopolitan ethics. Statist institutions cannot achieve 
justice unless they incorporate mechanisms that reach inside the state to address 
individual entitlements and obligations. To the extent that international 
adaptation-funding institutions address interstate relations without reference to 
the rights and entitlements of individuals, they will be, at best, blunt 
instruments for achieving justice, irrespective of how well they are funded.2
It may seem self-evident as a basic principle of equity that people and 
states whose wellbeing is seriously threatened by others' GHG emissions are 
owed compensation and assistance from those who have the capacity to assist 
or are most responsible for causing climate change. Indeed；, developed-state
2 For example, the goal o f the Kyoto Protocol Adaptation Fund is defined in terms of the activities 
that it is intended to carry out (i.e., 'to finance concrete adaptation projects and programmes in 
developing country Parties that are Parties to the Protocor), rather than by the norms or purposes 
that this activity is intended to further (UNFCCC CP7, 2001 Decision 10).
parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change have 
committed to 'assist the developing country Parties that are particularly. 
vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change in meeting the costs of 
adaptation to those adverse effects5 (United Nations 1992, Article 4.4). To date, 
however, developed states have resisted moves to impose legal liability for 
damages from climate change, and there is no international arrangement in 
place to deliver adaptation assistance on a scale commensurate with need. 
Promising initiatives have assisted the most vulnerable states to prioritise and 
communicate their needs (Mace 2006, p. 71). However, the various adaptation 
funding meehanisms, such as the Special Climate Change Fund， the Least 
Developed Country Fund and the Kyoto Protocol Adaptation Fund, are 
primarily funded on a voluntary basis and are chronically under-resourced.3 
While the United Nations Development Programme estimates that by 2015 
annual costs for adaptation to climate change in developing countries will be 
about $86 billion (UNDP 2007, p. 194), estimates suggest that total existing 
commitments (through 2012) stand at only about $200 million (Muller 2008, p. 
7). Even under optimistic scenarios, the need for adaptation assistance will be 
orders of magnitude greater than projected funding.
Many developing states complain that most climate change-related aid is 
targeted at 'mitigation-related projects and programmes5 and that 'projects on 
adaptation have so far focused on analytical work, capacity-building and impact 
assessments’， in the process giving ‘little attention …to practical 
implementation of adaptation measures^UNFCCC 2008, p. 7). Developing 
countries have demanded "compensation for damages due to unavoidable 
adverse impacts of climate change9 (Muller 2006, p. 3) and promoted a variety 
of innovative funding mechanisms for repayment of the developed worlds 
accrued Climatic debt' (Muller 2006, p. 3). The scholarly response to these 
demands has included condemnation of the United Nations climate-change 
process for failing to create ‘an institutionalised, equitable, and adequate 
burden-sharing arrangement for addressing the costs of adaptation9 (Mace 2006? 
p. 55), exploration of innovative, new international sources of adaptation 
funding (Muller 2008), and detailed expositions of a cosmopolitan case for 
justifying the global poor^ entitlement to assistance for adaptation to climate 
change (Caney 2005, Dobson 2006, Vanderheiden 2008).
3 In addition to voluntary contributions, the Adaptation Fund receives proceeds equivalent to 2 
percent o f certified emission reductions issued for Clean Development Mechanism projects.
We consider the normative case for global adaptation cost sharing from 
the perspectives of communitarian and cosmopolitan accounts of justice. 
Communitarian philosophy is open to the abstract possibility of obligations 
being owed between states, but it is unlikely that communitarians would accept 
a national obligation to compensate (Miller 2007, pp. 135-161, Thompson 
2002). With respect to vulnerable individuals’ entitlements to assistance, 
communitarians would first call upon each national community to provide relief 
and, when national communities are unable to assist, communitarians might 
argue that the international community has a duty to assist individuals facing 
extreme hardship. Cosmopolitan accounts focus on justice between people 
rather than between states. While cosmopolitan accounts of climate justice 
differ, most agree that individual victims of human-induced climate change 
should be compensated and that the obligation to assist should be distributed 
according to some calculus that recognises capacity and historical responsibility 
as well as practical considerations such as proximity (Caney 2005, Harris 2009, 
Jagers & Goran 2008). In short, both communitarian and cosmopolitan 
philosophies offer justifications for sharing the burdens of adaptation to climate 
change among people rather than only among states (e.g.? in the form of 
interstate payments). Therefore, funding for climate adaptation can justifiably 
be conditional on targeting the most disadvantaged populations.
The potentially catastrophic consequences of climate change require 
reappraisal of normative theories that justify statist international institutions and 
an exclusively statist concept of justice. Where the communitarian tradition 
defends the autonomy of national communities and maintains that special moral 
obligations arise in the context of political community, these positions are 
challenged by the intrinsic global interconnections revealed by climate change. 
It is inconsistent to ascribe moral value to the autonomy of political 
communities if the unintended consequence of autonomous national decision­
making is an environmental catastrophe that threatens collective survival.
In the discussion that follows, we appraise the implications of these 
arguments for the design of adaptation institutions. We outline some key 
features of an institutional structure for sharing costs of adaptation, including 
mandating intra-state redistribution as a sine qua non of inter-state 
redistribution, consistent with principles of cosmopolitan justice. We reject the 
argument that existing institutions for sharing adaptation costs among states, 
although imperfect, are the best possible arrangements given political
5
constraints. Instead, movement toward a cosmopolitan conceptualisation of 
responsibility and entitlement is required for future agreements to be more 
politically palatable and effectiye in providing adaptation-assistance to 
vulnerable populations. The application of these principles can be illustrated 
through discussion of inequality of responsibility, varying capabilities and 
vulnerabilities, and climate-related adaptation needs in China.
Duties and Entitlements to Assistance
Most arguments for adaptation burden sharing are broadly cosmopolitan, 
in that they are premised in conceptions of justice that see thick moral 
obligations arising internationally rather than exclusively within national 
societies (Rawls, 1971). However, even though communitarian analysis of 
climate change mitigation and (especially) adaptation is underdeveloped, a case 
for adaptation burden sharing could equally be grounded in communitarian 
philosophy. Explication of communitarian thought is important because, if 
adaptation funding institutions are justified by cosmopolitan principles alone, 
then existing institutions are normatively incoherent in that they are justified by 
a concern for cosmopolitan justice that cannot be fulfilled through exclusively 
statist funding mechanisms.
Any argument concerning responsibility for costs of adapting to climate 
change, whether cosmopolitan or communitarian， must assess where burdens 
should fall and which actors (states, communities, companies? individuals, etc.) 
owe which duties to whom. Here it is helpful to observe that principles of 
distributive justice are commonly assessed from two directions: in terms of the 
reasons why actors are either ‘entitled’ to goods or are obligated as ‘duty- 
bearers5 with respect to others (Caney, 2005b9 p. 111). The 'polluter pays* 
principle of compensation for harm serves as a touchstone for much reflection 
on the ethics of adaptation burden sharing (Jagers & Goran 2008, Shue 1999, p. 
537), and redistribution between peopJe is justified on the grounds of human 
rights (Caney 2005a, pp. 767-9). Redistribution may be justified simply because 
conditions create an 'entitlemenf to assistance that arises independently from 
the responsibility of other actors (Caney 2005a, pp. 767-9). In assessing where 
obligation falls in the absence of responsibility, capacity and degree of 
connection may be of central importance. The duty to provide such assistance is 
of a different kind from that arising when one party has harmed another and 
thus more obviously owes compensation.
The cosmopolitan view.of adaptation entitlements
The distinguishing feature of cosmopolitanism is its claim that humanity 
constitutes a single moral community; the individual human is the ultimate 
object of moral entitlements and obligations. This moral value applies 
universally and accords equal value to all people (Pogge 2002, p. 169), A clear 
distinction between cosmopolitan and communitarian philosophy emerges over 
the question of a disadvantaged individual^ entitlement to assistance for 
adaptation to climate change, irrespective of the culpability of others.
Among cosmopolitan thinkers, the idea that all individuals have a basic 
set of entitlements is relatively uncontroyersial, even if there is considerable 
disagreement about the exact content of these entitlements. For example, in 
seeking to justify an individual entitlement to assistance for help in adapting to 
climate change, Simon Caney argues that fa person has a right to X when X is a 
fundamental interest that is weighty enough to generate obligations on others' 
(Caney 2005a? pp. 767-9). The major ill effects of climate change ~ drought and 
crop failure, heatstroke, infectious diseases, flooding, destruction of homes and 
infrastructure, enforced relocation and other dramatic changes to the natural, 
social and economic world ~ constitute violations of just such a fundamental 
interest. As a consequence, obligations to provide mitigation and adaptation 
assistance flow to those with the capacity to provide it (Caney 2005a, pp. 767_ 
9 ). While cosmopolitans may debate the question of precisely who has the 
obligation to assist, few would question the individuaFs entitlement where 
fundamental interests are threatened. To the extent that entitlements can be met 
without impairing the fundamental interests of others, all individuals have an 
entitlement to protection of their fundamental interests from the negative 
consequences of climate change through mitigation efforts (i.e., cutting GHG 
emissions) and through adaptation assistance.
The communitarian view o f adaptation entitlements
The communitarian position with respect to climate-adaptation 
entitlements is more complex. An ambiguity arises from the communitarian 
emphasis on the moral significance of national membership, which cuts two 
ways. Communitarian thinking is consistent with the idea of inherited national 
responsibility to make recompense for historic wrongs, but promotes scepticism 
about the depth of obligations owed beyond national communities (Miller 2007,
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pp. 135-161, Thompson 2002). It is thus an open question whether climate 
change involves the kind of clear-cut moral culpability that would substantiate 
the developing world’s argument that adaptation costs constitute a ‘debt’ owed 
by rich countries to poor ones (Muller 2006, p. 3).
In formulating standards of global justice appropriate for international 
society, David Miller proposes that we must balance fitwo aspects of the human 
condition,: that people are at once 'needy and vulnerable creatures who may not 
be able to live decently without the help of others, and that individuals and 
communities are 'choosing agents9 who should live with the consequences 
(positive or negative) of their decisions (Miller 2007, p. 81). Miller’s proposed 
concept of global justice achieves this balance by recognising a fiset of basic 
human rights which must be protected for people everywhere regardless of 
circumstances5 as a 'basic minimum5, but he stipulates that beyond this basic 
minimum justice only requires 'fair terms of cooperation5 between different 
societies (Miller 2007, pp. 266-7).
How would entitlement to adaptation assistance be treated within this 
communitarian schema of international obligation? We can reasonably infer 
that individuals are entitled to assistance to the degree that climate change 
either constitutes a harm breaching 'fair terms o f cooperation' for which 
another party is morally culpable or impacts on basic, universal 6physical-cum- 
biologicar . and social needs (Miller 2007, pp. 178-97). Miller’s 
communitarianism accepts that there is a limited universal individual 
entitlement to protection. Nonetheless， Miller opposes "inflated human rights 
rhetoric’ （Miller 2007, p. 266) and intentionally sets a very high bar for the 
point at which individuals gain entitlements grounded in international justice, 
namely preservation of the minimal conditions necessary to pursuit of a decent 
human life. Michael Blake (2001) and Thomas Nagle (2001) advance similar 
arguments rejecting ideas of international justice in favour of the view that 
states' external obligations extend only to providing the minimum assistance 
necessary to preserve the autonomy of non-nationals (Blake 2001) or to 
recognising 4the most basic human rights and duties5 (Nagel 2005).
Communitarian perspectives on the duty to assist
If some individuals are recognised to possess an entitlement t〇 protection 
from the most harmful aspects of climate change, we must identify who is 
obligated to provide this assistance. Setting aside the questions of moral
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responsibility and compensation for a moment, we see another fundamental 
distinction between communitarian and cosmopolitan perspectives. Where 
cosmopolitanism is a universal philosophy in which nationality has no bearing 
on moral obligations (except insofar as national membership relates to other 
criteria, such as the practicality of providing assistance), communitarianism 
views the satisfaction of individual entitlements as a moral obligation of 
national communities. It is only in the event that a national community is 
unable or unwilling to assist that international obligations may arise. As Miller 
explains:
basic human rights as I understand them have a central role to play in any 
theory of global justice. All political communities are required to respect 
and protect the rights of their own members, and any community may 
potentially be asked to assume onerous responsibilities to protect human 
rights beyond its own borders (Miller 2007, p. 200).
This raises the question of which communities are obligated to provide 
assistance. Here, arguments about 'responsibility to assist5 inevitably intersect 
with ideas about ‘responsibility for harm’.
In reflecting on the allocation o f ‘remedial responsibility’， Miller enlists a 
distinction between moral responsibility^ which is the kind of 'responsibility 
necessary for moral praise or blame,; outcome responsibility, which arises 
when an agent has produced an outcome through the exercise of agency; and 
strict causal responsibility, which arises when an actor 'causes' an outcome 
irrespective of moral culpability or 6exercise of agency1 (Miller 2007, pp. 86-9). 
Miller argues that it is only when an actor has moral responsibility for another's 
loss does it have an obligation to provide full compensation. Nevertheless, 
where moral culpability does not arise, other forms of responsibility may be 
relevant to allocating responsibility to protect human rights. Miller proposes a 
‘connection theory’ whereby responsibility for remedying an person's condition 
should be allocated according to the degree of connection (Miller 2007, pp. 86- 
9). He proposes three additional criteria that are relevant to the allocation of 
responsibility: benefit (i.e.， if A has benefited from B’s loss, they are 
connected), capacity and community (Miller 2007, pp. 86-9), What is 
distinctive about this typology is the communitarian emphasis on the 
desirability of national communities living with the consequences of their
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choices and of the appropriateness of burden sharing among those connected by 
bonds of national membership. If climate change has arisen through processes 
that involve moral culpability, it follows that Miller would likely endorse the 
payment of compensation between states.
Many cosmopolitan analysts of climate compensation are wary of a 
potential injustice toward individuals embodied in the concept of 
intergenerational obligation because this approach discriminates among people 
on the basis of their membership in national communities and because there is a 
paradox in considering a person as a beneficiary of past industrialisation if they 
would not have been bom were it not for industrialisation (Caney 2005, p. 559, 
Page 2008, pp. 756-761). In contrast, communitarian thinking offers some 
support for national intergenerational responsibility (Miller 2007, pp. 135-161, 
Thompson 2002). However, if there is no clear moral culpability, or if muddied 
lines of causation obstruct the attribution of responsibility, then there is no 
argument for compensation, and most communitarians would oppose 
international redistribution. The communitarian default position is to support 
national but not international burden sharing.
■ Miller^ discussion of responsibility suggests that he could not hold states 
to have either ‘moral’ or "outcome’ responsibi!ity for GHG emissions predating 
scientific certainty regarding the likely consequences of those emissions (Miller 
2007, pp. 86-9). As such, and given the considerable lag time between GHG 
emissions and their full consequences， it seems unlikely that Miller would 
endorse substantial international sharing of the costs o f adaptation. The 
communitarian case for ‘moral responsibility’ and compensation is stronger for 
emissions following the emergence of reasonable scientific certainty; the 
publication of the first IPCC Assessment Report in 1990 is a commonly 
accepted marker for when this certainty was reached (Page 2008, pp. 562-4). 
However, we might speculate that a sceptical communitarian would point to a 
variety of factors that undermine the argument for compensation even for harms 
caused by more recent emissions: (1) the complexity of the climate system is 
such that there is not a sufficiently direct relationship between cause and effect 
to enable a calculation of actual harm caused by a particular emitter; (2) the 
character of climate change as a collective action problem dilutes moral 
culpability in that no individual actor had the capacity to arrest the problem 
individually; (3) climate change is an unintended consequence and so is a case 
of tcausal, rather than 'moral5 responsibility; (4) the complicity of all states
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(including developing states) in contributing to the problem may be relevant to 
the calculus o f  moral responsibility; (5) developed states that built their 
infrastructure prior to 1990 are now 'locked in? to high-emission lifestyles and 
thus have diminished responsibility (〇tt & Sachs 2002, p, 169); (6) in line with 
communitarian arguments against redistribution more generally, states that have 
allowed poor governance to limit their development might be considered to 
have some contributory responsibility for their vulnerability to climate change. 
While these arguments are controversial, they illustrate why a communitarian 
assessment might not find developed states to be morally culpable and would 
therefore reject the associated argument for climate compensation between 
states.
We can draw two conclusions from the communitarian argument. First, 
communitarians look to national communities as the realm of justice and 
guarantors of a decent life for all. In the event that a state does not protect basic 
individual entitlements, some communitarians recognise an obligation for the 
International community to provide assistance. The intent of this assistance is to 
fulfil a humanitarian duty toward individuals rather than to correct interstate 
inequalities. Second, while communitarian arguments might be made in support 
of compensation payments between states for harms caused by recent emissions, 
the justification for such compensation is, at best, ambiguous.
The cosmopolitan perspective on the duty to assist
While cosmopolitan analysis of climate change-related duties has 
frequently been mired in similar complications concerning the moral basis for 
compensation (e.g. debates over individual responsibility for the emissions of 
past generations - see Caney 2005a, pp. 756-80) the cosmopolitan principle that 
all individuals have equal moral value tips most cosmopolitan thinkers toward 
favouring adaptation assistance (Caney 2005a, Caney 2005b, Dobson 2006? 
Jagers 8c Goran 2008). If the global poor have been harmed by actions of the 
rich, the cosmopolitan tendency is to argue that those responsible should redress 
the loss. In many cosmopolitan accounts, the 'polluter pays5 principle of 
compensation for harm is supplemented by an 'ability to pay5 principle (Caney 
2005b, Jagers & Goran 2008, pp. 581-2, Shue 1999, p. 537) or a 'beneficiary 
[of past GHG pollution] pays5 principle (Page 2008, pp. 562-4). Among 
cosmopolitan theorists there is near consensus that the most disadvantaged 
victims of climate change deserve adaptation assistance from industrialised
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states even if there is disagreement about the principles governing allocation of 
responsibility to pay (Gardiner 2004, p. 579).
In assessing a cosmopolitanism allocation of responsibility to assist we 
must consider the different kinds of duty bearers. Does the principle of human 
moral equality mean that those with the responsibility to assist are also people, 
rather than (or only) states, companies or other collective actors? As noted 
above, the allocation of responsibility is a matter of cosmopolitan debate. Some 
argue that individuals are the only duty-bearers even if the only practicable way 
to discharge individual responsibilities is via institutional action (Jones 2002, 
pp. 68-9). Others propose that both individual and institutional responsibility 
are necessary for the achievement of justice (Dobson 2006, p. 182). Still others 
make explicit arguments that institutional agents, and not individuals, should be 
held responsible for complex international problems like climate change (Green 
2005, Scheffler 2002, pp. 40-5). Where one view argues that complex problems 
cannot be solved other than by institutions, the other argues that the impetus for 
institutional action will be lost if individuals are absolved of their moral 
responsibility. Nevertheless, cosmopolitans are united on the moral question of 
the inviolability of individual human rights -  'that every human being has a 
global stature as the ultimate unit of moral concern' (Pogge 1992, pp. 49). In a 
choice between a scheme that achieves assistance for adaptation to climate 
change exclusively through interstate assistance and one that reaches into the 
state by targeting individual needs and obligations, cosmopolitans are likely to 
choose the option they judge to be most effective in meeting individual 
entitlements.
The normative claims of communitarians and cosmopolitans regarding 
rights and duties related to climate adaptation are summarized in Table L The 
most surprising aspect of this survey is the degree of congruence between the 
two perspectives. The commonality between them has implications for the 
design of just institutions that are explored below. Both perspectives justify 
assistance targeting individual human needs. The key difference concerns the 
degree of assistance that disadvantaged people are entitled to receive.
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Table 1. Summary of normative claims
Claims Communitarian Reply Cosmopolitan Reply
Compensation 
between states
Limited: compensation is 
owed for harm caused in 
the case of knowing and 
deliberate ‘moral 
responsibility’ for harm; 
this condition is unlikely to 
be satisfied in the case of 
climate change.
As proxy: interstate 
payments may be a 
practical way to discharge 
individual obligations and 
entitlements, but only if 
safeguards ensure 
assistance reaches 
disadvantaged people.
Entitlement of 
vulnerable 
individuals to 
adaptation 
assistance
Potentially limited 
entitlements: Miller (2007, 
pp. 266-7) advocates 
restoration of basic rights 
necessary for a decent life; 
obligations ofjustice are 
owed only within states.
Yes*, entitlement to 
protection of all 
fundamental interests.
Bearers of 
responsibility
The state because the 
national community is the 
primary moral community; 
the international community 
may have limited 
obligations where national 
communities fail.
All capable people 
according to criteria of 
responsibility and capacity.
Cosmopolitan Implications for Adaptation Assistance
The strongest arguments favouring international assistance for adaptation 
to climate change are found in cosmopolitan conceptions of justice, which can 
be considered in terms of three core principles: equality of obligation (each 
person^ obligations should be judged according to universal criteria, rather 
than simply on the basis of national membership); equality of entitlement (each
13
person's entitlement to assistance should be judged according to universal 
criteria that do not vary with nationality); and universality (principles that 
govern international obligation should be consistent with those implemented 
domestically). In this section we articulate some of the implications of these 
principles for the institutional design of international funding for adaptation Jo 
climate change.
Within a system of sovereign states, cosmopolitan ends are most likely to 
be achieved through international agreements in which the majority of states 
coordinate their activities and collectively agree to implement a common set of 
cosmopolitan principles. If each state acts as an authority ensuring the 
application of cosmopolitan norms within its borders, consistency can be 
achieved between cosmopolitan principles and statist international institutions* 
Here the International Criminal Court (ICC) is an instructive example. While 
the principles that the ICC is designed to implement are cosmopolitan ~~ 
universal punishment of crimes against humanity even when committed by state 
officials ™ responsibility for implementing ICC provisions falls (in the first 
instance) to states (Ralph 2005). The supranational aspects of the ICCs 
jurisdiction apply when states fail to voluntarily implement agreed principles. 
An analogous arrangement might be used to redistribute climate adaptation 
costs according to cosmopolitan principles.
Because cosmopolitanism is a universal philosophy, an agreement on the 
sharing of adaptation burdens that is based on cosmopolitan principles would 
ensure equal treatment of all individuals irrespective of nationality. This 
requires that each individuaFs entitlement to assistance and obligation to assist 
should be assessed independently of nationality. While these principles sound 
innocuous, their implications for both developing world elites and the 
developed world's poor could be significant. Paul Harris (2009) describes the 
anomalies produced by the Kyoto Protocol’s state-based allocation of 
responsibility, notably the fact that extremely affluent people in developing 
countries are currently absolved of any obligations regarding climate change 
simply by virtue of where they reside, whereas even very poor people in 
developed countries are potentially subject to the laws, regulations and taxes 
that their governments are implementing to fulfil national obligations to cut 
GHGs, Treatment of Chinafs affluent territory of Hong Kong as just another 
region within that country, thus leaving it without any GHG emissions 
restrictions of any kind, simply because it is part of a developing state -  and the
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similar treatment of Hong Kong's billionaires simply because they reside inside 
China -  are examples of these anomalies. An international agreement reflecting 
cosmopolitan principles would eliminate these by ensuring that the affluent 
populations within even developing states make contributions equivalent to 
their capacity or equivalent to their level of pollution， depending on the agreed 
standard (e.g., a minority of people in, say, India, who are affluent by at least 
global standards, might be obligated to provide aid). Likewise, a cosmopolitan 
approach would seek to ensure that assistance is provided to the most 
disadvantaged communities, or even individuals, within developing and 
developed states alike (e.g., a minority of people in, say5 Britain, who are very 
poor by British standards, might be entitled to aid).
An international agreement reflecting cosmopolitan universalism would 
also need to achieve congruence between the principles that apply to the 
transfer of resources between states and the principles governing redistribution 
within states. Different institutional arrangements will be necessary in domestic 
and international contexts, but the underlying justificatory principles will be the 
same. For example, rather than international agreements merely requiring states 
to act in certain ways, those agreements might calculate state duties in tenns of 
the duties of capable persons within those states, with states and/or 
international institutions serving as the conduits for fulfilment of individual 
obligations through taxation or regulatory measures. Alternatively, states may 
agree to a certain level of internal redistribution of climate adaptation costs, but 
an agreement might allow individual states a degree of flexibility in the 
measures used to achieve this goal. It is also likely that future international 
agreements might link mitigation measures to adaptation flmding. For example, 
contributions to climate adaptation funds might be determined through 
measures similar to the mechanism whereby the Adaptation Fund receives a 
percentage of proceeds from Clean Development Mechanism (i.e., mitigation) 
projects.
An international agreement informed by cosmopolitan principles might 
also make domestic implementation of cosmopolitan standards a prerequisite 
for receipt of international assistance. For example, an international agreement 
could ground the obligations and entitlements of states in cosmopolitan 
standards by making each state's access to international adaptation funds 
conditional upon enactment of consistent sub-state measures. These might 
include programmes that address the vulnerability of the most disadvantaged
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populations through provision of enhanced public education, housing and health 
care, or that enforce the obligations of affluent citizens through taxes on GHG 
emissions or luxury consumption such as air travel. This proposal is vulnerable 
to abuse; developed states that are net donors to such a fund may use 
conditionality instrumentally. Carrots and sticks might constrain developing 
states but would be less likely to place reciprocal restraints on states that are the 
sources of ftinds (unless state obligations were assessed in a way that partly 
reflected fulfilment of cosmopolitan obligations internally). While these 
potential problems cannot be denied, such a scheme has a number of 
advantages in terms of stability, political feasibility, and promotion of good 
governance.
An international regime based on cosmopolitan principles, whereby each 
state's obligations are assessed according to the characteristics of its population, 
has the potential to be robust (stable) and politically feasible. This is because 
cosmopolitan principles allow a single set of rules to govern each state's 
entitlements and obligations. Rather than a fixed agreement like the Kyoto 
Protocol taking the form !state X undertakes obligation Y \  cosmopolitan 
principles point to an agreement in which each states5 internal and external 
obligations are assessed by reference to the wealth and GHG emissions of its 
population: each state accepts obligations that vary with the percentage of its 
population with specified characteristics. If we accept the conclusion from 
game theoretical analysis of institutional design that, in conditions of 
uncertainty about the future, stable regimes must include increased flexibility, 
we might expect that agreements based on cosmopolitan principles would be 
comparatively stable (Koremenos et al 2001). Such an agreement would contain 
sufficient flexibility to deal with changes in states5 circumstances. For example, 
principles agreed today that will see net assistance (financial aid and technology 
transfer) to5 say, China in the short term will require that in the future a 
wealthier China owes the same obligations to less developed states.
The universal aspect of cosmopolitan design principles would also have 
important consequences for the political feasibility of a cosmopolitan 
international agreement. First, the universal application of rules would blunt 
arguments that take the form 'Country X will only act once Country Y agrees to 
act'. Such self-interested arguments about fairness are probably permanent 
fixtures of political discourse. However, if the same rules are used to assess the 
obligation of all people irrespective of nationality (and state obligations derive
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from equal universal treatment), this kind of self-interested argument might be 
more readily rebutted. The argument that developed country X should not 
contribute to climate adaptation costs unless developing county Y also takes 
action has a nationalist appeal (and an appeal to the accepted norm of 
reciprocity) that cannot be marshalled against rules that impose identical 
obligations on affluent Americans and affluent Chinese. Second, states' 
awareness that their comparative international position will change over time 
might lead them to be more cooperative in negotiating cosmopolitan 
international rules. For example, the Chinese government -  cognizant of its 
rapidly improving relative economic position -  may be more amenable to the 
viewpoints of developed states if it were negotiating a long-term agreement in 
which obligations are continually updated to reflect demographic characteristics 
rather than negotiating fixed future commitments.
An agreement based on cosmopolitan principles would also seek to 
promote good governance and pro-poor development by including incentives 
for each (recipient) state to ensure that adaptation assistance is given to its 
poorest citizens. By making each state's entitlement to international 
compensation dependent upon equivalent domestic measures, a cosmopolitan 
international agreement would address the problem of enforcing the 
responsibilities of developing-country elites. In situations where state 
governments or elites demonstrably profit from aid, assistance would ideally be 
channelled to intended recipients through mechanisms that bypass the state 
(such as non-governmental organizations or reputable international 
organizations), or the aid could be held in trust until governance quality 
improves.
To illustrate the application of the cosmopolitan approach, in the next 
section we briefly discuss several issues related to climate adaptation with some 
reference to China. We focus on China because its size, rapid economic growth 
and extreme income inequality make it a paradigmatic case reflecting the 
complexities of climate justice. It is also the largest national source of GHGs 
and its people will be severely affected by the impacts of climate change.
Implementing the Cosmopolitan Approach
The precise future impacts of climate change in Asia are subject to a high 
level of uncertainty. Predictive modelling, confirmed by observed changes, 
suggests that there will be significant changes in patterns of rainfall and
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agricultural productivity, increases in extreme climatic events such as typhoons, 
heatwaves, droughts, floods and mudslides, changes (net increase) in the 
distribution of insect-bome diseases, and increasing water scarcity in many 
parts of Asia. These changes will vary between states and across different 
regions within states and their impacts will differ depending on the 
vulnerability of human populations. For example the IPCC reports that 4tcrop 
yield projection using HadCM2 indicate that crop yields could likely increase 
up to 20% in East and South-East Asia while it could decrease up to 30% in 
Central and South Asia even if the direct positive physiological effects of C02 
are taken into account.” （Cruz et al” 2007: 479) As a consequence of the net 
decline in agricultural productivity global cereal prices have been ''projected to 
increase more than three-fold by the 2080s,5 and cause growing food scarcity 
among Asia’s poor. (Cruz et al” 2007: 482, Parry et al.，2004).
A common feature among all of these threats is that the worst affected 
will be the poorest and most vulnerable segments of each national society. For 
example, the impact of heatwaves, typhoons, floods and insect-bome disease is 
most severe on people with inadequate shelter. If changing weather conditions 
necessitate changes in crop variety and farming methods, the raised costs of 
more capital-intensive farming methods will often be prohibitive for the poorest 
farmers. The impact of a decline in total agricultural activity is also hardest on 
the poor. The IPCC finds that ''subsistence producers growing crops, such as 
sorghum, millet, etc., could be at the greatest risk, both from a potential drop in 
productivity as well as from the danger of losing crop genetic diversity that has 
been preserved over generations. The risk of hunger, thus, is likely to remain 
very high in several developing countries with an additional 49 million, 132 
million and 266 million people of Asia projected under A2 scenario without 
carbon fertilization that could be at risk of hunger by 2020, 2050 and 2080, 
respectively” （Cruz et al.，2007: 482)
In order to adapt to the challenge of climate change, states may take a 
variety of measures to protect human welfare and economic productivity. The 
process of adaptation will inevitably involve political decisions that prioritise 
particular interests and will create new sets of ‘winners’ and ‘losers’. As Neil 
Adger argues, evidence from around the world suggests that vulnerable groups 
generally have limited input into the public management of climate-related risks 
(Adger 2003: pp. 387-404, Pelling 1998: pp. 469-86). Poor households are, for 
example, 'forced to live in hazardous areas on the margins of urban settlements,
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which puts them at risk of flooding, and are frequently ignored when 
infrastructure is designed to alleviate such vulnerabilities^Adger 2003: pp. 387- 
404? Felling 1998: pp. 469-86). Whether adaptation measures address only the 
economic priorities of the state or also target the human development of the 
most vulnerable populations is a crucial question for the achievement of 
cosmopolitan justice.
For example, the IPCC identifies significant examples of adaptation to 
include expanded rainwater harvesting, water storage, conservation and 
irrigation efficiency, adjusting crop varieties and land management, creation of 
buffers against sea-level rise (wetlands, sea-walls and so forth), emergency 
medical service provision, climate-sensitive disease control, improved 
sanitation, provision of safe water, redesign of road and rail infrastructure, and 
improvement of energy distribution infrastructure (such as underground cabling) 
(Cruz et al 2007，p. 482， Erda et al 2005). These specific measures are 
necessary to protect collective wellbeing. However, they can be implemented in 
ways that either reduce or reinforce the vulnerability of disadvantaged 
populations. For example, if reductions in the area of arable land necessitate an 
intensification of farming methods within the remaining fertile areas, or 
adoption of precision farming methods, such changes will be comparatively 
capital intensive (Cruz et al., 2007: 482; Erda et al.5 2005). Without targeted 
assistance this change may result in poor farming communities losing their 
traditional livelihoods. In this circumstance, adaptation may have the effect of 
dispossessing, rather than benefiting, existing agricultural workers and farmers. 
Thus, if adaptation to climate change is to address injustice as well as economic 
needs, it must include measures to address the vulnerability and 
impoverishment of disadvantaged communities, such as provision of universal 
education, housing and health-services.
A cosmopolitan concern with justice in climate adaptation is distinct from 
a concern, with effective adaptation based on an economically defined 'national 
interesf. This distinction may justify conditionality in international adaptation 
funding. A state seeking to maximise net economic prosperity may implement 
adaptation policies that do not protect its most vulnerable citizens. For example, 
infrastructure engineered to withstand climatic extremes may not benefit those 
who are excluded from its use. If the goal of an international climate adaptation 
funding agreement is to address injustice between people, rather than injustice 
between states, the type of adaptation adopted by states will be the proper
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concern of the international agreement. Conditionality, although widely 
critiqued by China and other developing states (UNFCCC 2008), may be 
ethically justified if it is used to ensure that adaptation policies and measures 
actually advance the interests of the most vulnerable.
The IPCC identifies significant examples of adaptation to include 
expanded rainwater harvesting, water storage, conservation and irrigation 
efficiency, adjusting crop varieties and land management, creation of buffers 
against sea-level rise (wetlands, sea-walls and so forth), emergency medical 
service provision, climate-sensitive disease control, improved sanitation, 
provision of safe water, redesign of road and rail infrastructure, and 
improvement of energy distribution infrastructure (Cruz et al 2007: pp. 469-506, 
Erda et al 2005: pp. 2149-54) These specific measures are necessary to protect 
collective wellbeing. However, they can be implemented in ways that either 
reduce or reinforce the vulnerability of disadvantaged populations. For example, 
if reductions in the area of arable land necessitate an intensification of farming 
methods within the remaining fertile areas or adoption of precision farming 
methods, such changes will be comparatively capital intensive (Cruz et al 2007: 
pp, 469-506, Erda et al 2005: pp. 2149-54). Without targeted assistance this 
change may result in poor farming communities losing their traditional 
livelihoods. In this circumstance, adaptation may have the effect of 
dispossessing, rather than benefiting, existing agricultural workers and farmers. 
Thus, if adaptation to climate change is to address injustice as well as economic 
needs, it must include measures to address the vulnerability and 
impoverishment of disadvantaged communities, such as provision of universal 
education, housing and health-services.
The argument for sub-national targeting of adaptation assistance for the 
achievement of cosmopolitan justice is possibly most starkly illustrated by the 
case of China. With approximately 20 percent of the global population, China is 
responsible for only 8 percent of greenhouse gas emissions since 1850 (Chu & 
Thornton 2009，p. 18) and around 18 percent of current global emissions 
(Garnaut 2008, p. 65). This figure is expected to rise to approximately 33 
percent of global emissions by 2030 (Garnaut 2008, p. 65). In other words, on a 
per capita basis China is currently responsible for just under the global emission 
average, but in the coming years this will rise to above the global average. 
Meanwhile, although China's per capita income is still little more than one- 
eighth of US income, it is rapidly approaching the global average (International
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Monetary Fund 2009). If in coming years China!s people are on average slightly 
wealthier than the global average, and responsible for slightly more than 
average GHG emissions, how should China's responsibility or entitlement for 
climate adaptation assistance be judged?
Thinking in terms of inter-state fairness, rather than global justice, we 
would likely judge that China is owed a historical debt by developed states. If 
we were to assess responsibility for climate adaptation costs in terms of 
historical contribution and present day affluence we would probably conclude 
that China is currently owed compensation for the costs of climate mitigation 
and adaptation, but that in coming decades, as its share of total emissions 
approaches and then passes the global per capita average, it will begin to accrue 
responsibilities to assist less developed states. However, such an analysis would 
be incomplete.
By looking inside the state at the distribution of wealth, emissions and 
adaptation costs, we see a much more complex picture. At a most basic level we 
would note that different impacts of climate change in different areas demand a 
response that is targeted more precisely than unconditional interstate assistance. 
If part of the purpose of adaptation funding is to compensate for losses we 
should observe that farmers in northeast and northern China, where rainfall is 
decreasing, may have greater entitlements than those near the south-eastern 
coast where rainfall is increasing (although increasing costs from flooding in 
the latter region may cancel any benefits from additional rainfall) (Cruz et al 
2007, pp. 472-3).
More significant than the different regional impacts of climate change are 
different levels of human vulnerability and capacity to adapt. Such inequalities 
are likely to be ignored by policy makers if their focus is primarily on economic 
adaptation. In rough terms, although China remains a relatively poor country, 
its population straddles the international mean of wealth and GHG emissions. 
An exceptionally high level of inequality throughout the country, including an 
unusually sharp rural/urban divide, means that many urban residents clearly 
number among the globed more affluent people, while many of the rural poor 
live in poverty (Luo & Zhu 2008). For example, in 2004 an average urban 
resident earned 3.2 times the income of an average rural resident, while per 
capita income in coastal areas was 2.4 times that inland (Luo & Zhu 2008). 
These ratios of national inequality are 'among the highest in the world5 (Luo & 
Zhu 2008). And they say nothing of the millions of very affluent people in
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China's cities. Assessed in terms of human entitlement and obligation, we can 
say that a significant number of Chinese people, numbering at least in the tens 
of millions, are among the global rich and lead lifestyles with an atmospheric 
impact to match. Their degree of responsibility for climate change, and capacity 
to assist, is similar to that of developed world populations (see Harris 2009). 
Such people should be contributors to, rather than recipients of, international 
efforts seeking to achieve adaptation justice. By contrast, China’s rural (and in 
some cases urban) poor are owed significant adaptation assistance that, by the 
standards of cosmopolitan justice, should target vulnerability by promoting 
human development.
Conclusion
Just as the challenge of negotiating an effective international response to 
climate change is proving to be an insoluble cooperation problem within an 
international system of sovereign states, so too might be the problem of 
compensating the victims. Before we can hope to achieve justice we first need 
to reach a shared understanding of what a just outcome actually entails. The 
despoiling of the global atmospheric commons poses a unique challenge. 
Established patterns of normative reasoning and attribution of responsibiJity 
emerged from human communities in which the consequences of action were 
much more limited. While international governance is increasingly 'globalised5, 
international political structures remain focused on national autonomy and 
inter-state relationships. This state-centric system thus fails to cope with the 
realities of climate change.
Achieving an international agreement that justly distributes the costs and 
benefits of adaptation to climate change involves challenges of normative 
analysis and institutional design. We have reflected on how normative 
justifications for international assistance for climate adaptation might be 
translated into norms for inclusion in such an agreement. There is considerable 
debate over the allocation of responsibility for adaptation costs. Disagreements 
over the appropriate balance of collective and historical responsibility against 
individual capacity and responsibility must ultimately be resolved through a 
process of political negotiation. Since defensible arguments underscore each of 
these principles, only the political legitimization of these norms through 
participatory international negotiations can provide resolution. Likewise, 
achieving agreement over the forms and degree of hardship that warrant
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adaptation assistance must inevitably be a political process. Here we have 
proposed that a just international agreement concerning climate adaptation costs 
must be based on cosmopolitan principles. Such an agreement would not simply 
ensure redistribution among states, but would reach inside the state to target the 
most vulnerable people.
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